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state groups, and a complex hybrid of conflict involving both state and non-state actors.
Cyber warfare is a tool of national power, and countries are greatly improving their capabilities to conduct military operations in cyberspace. This is a domain where 'failure is not an option'. An entire nation's ability to operate and fight in the information age is vital toward survival. Nowadays, cyber warfare is mostly focused on economics which may be the shortcut to their victory. This strategic research project addresses the strategic-level issues related to cyber warfare, and describes the need for good national policies and strategies that are adequately resourced. It will focus on the case of the Republic of Turkey and the unique challenges facing that country in planning and implementing such a strategy. This paper will define cyber warfare, cyberspace and provide an analysis on the potential impact this threat could have on both the government and private sector. Finally, it will offer a recommended strategy for Turkey with recommendations for organizational structures and resource requirements.
CYBER SECURITY: A ROAD MAP FOR TURKEY
When the Internet was designed, security was not a consideration. No one predicted that the new technology would become a global infrastructure that there would be incredible increase in speed, connectivity and the number of users (currently more than 2 billion). Rapid, unexpected growth combined with a too-rosy view of technological progress has led to some very real dangers. The absence of rules to govern international behavior in cyberspace compounds the problem. The effect of the new technologies is not dissolving borders but to shrink distance.
-James Andrew Lewis 1 The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) states that "military, intelligence, and business operations all depend upon cyberspace for mission success." 2 This is also true for Turkey. Cyberspace is a new and challenging global domain, and it is imperative all nations keep cyberspace "safe, secure, and available for use." 3 This paper will provide a strategic direction for Turkey to meet this challenge.
Cyber warfare is a tool of national power, sometimes seen as analogous to conventional warfare, where the threats involve ranges of potential actors, including nation states, non-state groups, and complex hybrids of both state and non-state actors working together. "Over 120 nations are engaged in developing cyber warfare capability," 4 demonstrating the degree to which nations recognize cyber warfare as one of the most vital national security challenges for today and in the future.
Yet not all nations have prioritized their cyber warfare efforts as they should, and risk being caught unprepared. For example, although Turkey approved cyber terrorism and other cyber threats in a formal list of threats to national security, it still has not created a national cyber security umbrella or incorporated this strategy as part of its anti-terror warfare policy. comparison with the traditional ones. To achieve and most importantly sustain success in this battlefield, maintaining tactical and organizational agility and adaptation are a must. Finally, "cyberspace is now a battle space" 9 and it is not possible for any single player to control it completely. The real definition of success in this man-made global domain should be described as "effective use of domain rather than physical control of it." 10 The concept of cyber warfare within the cyberspace is a war against a faceless enemy.
Defining Cyber Warfare. The U.S. DoD defines information warfare as "actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting an adversary`s information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one's own information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks." 11 This is the definition that will be used for the purpose of this paper. In addition to these, cyber warfare is relatively "cheap" 15 , and like maneuver warfare, speed and agility matter most. 16 Cyber warfare as a form of information warfare is no longer an esoteric topic of interest to special groups of people with unique technical skills. 17 18 Despite numerous cyber incidents, threats and actors are still in hidden in its grey void of state-financed warfare. . Attacks against them carry political and economic consequences and can be targets for politically motivated hacktivists or economically motivated hackers at the same time.
One of the most common targets for cyber actors is personal data, which a vital importance in every aspect. Cyber warriors and criminals alike can use stolen or hacked personal information to steal identities, seize bank accounts, or conduct fraud. From the perspective of global businesses, it is clear that this has a severe effect on national and global economies. These are significant concerns for governments, businesses, and individuals in the ability to trust the economy and the safeguarding of their personal information.
Actors in cyberspace include both states and non-states, and they range from unsophisticated amateurs to highly trained professional cyber warriors. All actors in this domain have the ability to execute their attacks from anywhere, such as an office in New York City or a small house room in a village in Turkey. All that is required is a computer and a network connection. This is the capability which makes them unusual and dangerous enemies.
As James Andrew Lewis, a senior fellow and McAfee still has no direct evidence to name the originators of that attack so far.
Cyber incidents significantly increased the profile of cyber warfare. 34 Stuxnet has a unique status in all these cyber incidents that occurred so far. It is one of two largescale successful sabotage efforts against infrastructure. Iran was attacked by the Stuxnet worm, thought to specifically target its Natanz nuclear enrichment facility in September 2010. The worm was the most advanced piece of malware ever discovered.
This intentionally designed malware directed against a nation-state resulted in the physical destruction of state-owned equipment. Gary D. Brown, in his article Why Iran Didn`t Admit Stuxnet was an Attack describes physical damage of the attack as "The centrifuges were destroyed as effectively as if someone had taken a hammer to them, and these were not just random bits of equipment." 35 On November 9, 2011, the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) attacked and brought down the Turkish Finance Ministry (www.maliye.gov.tr) website. They replaced the website with propaganda material. Ultimately, no taxpayer information was affected.
It was a denial of service incident executed by a terrorist organization.
In January 2012, the Information and Communications Authority (ICTA), governmental institution responsible from coordination of cyber security efforts in Turkey, was hacked itself. It was also a denial of service incident that executers not known.
Cyber Security: Challenges Janczewski Lech and Colaric Andrew, in their book Cyber Warfare and Cyber
Terrorism, describe cyber security as "the newest and most unique national security issue of the twenty-first century." 36 Cyber security, without international or public boundaries, has no easy "regulatory, behavioral or technological fix" as well. 37 Cyber security is the sum of the attempts to secure our vulnerabilities against attacks/incidents of cyber attackers within cyberspace. In other words, cyber security is the sum of the attempts to secure our vulnerabilities against the faceless enemy. Do we know who they are or where they are? Which abilities and capabilities do they have?
Their unpredictable techniques and tactics make them increasingly more and more sophisticated due to their nature within a man-made, boundless global battlefield.
There are too many unknowns. In such a foggy circumstance, the government or private sector has to deal with this huge challenge through several tactics-"new legislation, a push for international standards, public awareness campaigns and heightened surveillance." 38 To make this picture clear, nations need to pursue "a multilayered cyber security approach" 39 to deter, prevent, detect, defend against and quickly recover from cyber threats coming from attackers not bound by normal legal and cultural restraints.
Cyber security is still mostly undefined territory and its doctrine far from mature.
While trying to achieve multi-layered cyber security, nations must overcome some basic challenges. These are global and directly affect national cyber security policies. 45 For NATO, an attack would trigger a potential self-defense response by the Alliance and this cyber incident did not meet their threshold of an attack of war. 46 Although some tend to call incidents such as these attacks, NATO's rebuff showed that no matter how malicious an action was, if there was "no damage, death or destruction" 47 it would not be considered as an armed attack.
What is a Cyber Attack, and How is it Distinguished from
Only three cyber incidents could meet this standard of an equivalent to armed attack. First was the Stuxnet virus, which destroyed equipment in an Iranian nuclear facility. Second was the reported blackout in Brazil. Third was Israel`s alleged disruption of Syrian air defenses in 2007 during a raid on a suspected nuclear facility. 48 At this point, everything else can be qualified as crime or espionage.
Accountability: who is outside? Accountability is the second major challenge in cyber security. The structural anonymity of cyberspace allows "masking both perpetrator and motive." 49 It's not easy to detect what or who is responsible for incidents or attacks, because it is practically very difficult to track the point of attack as various IPs are being used as cover.
In addition to this, sometimes victims may not even know when they were attacked. For example, in the Stuxnet case, the Iranians were unaware that they were under attack, and several months later still have not determined the source of the worm. 50 In the Night Dragon case, McAfee has no direct evidence to name the originators of these attacks but said they had "strong evidence suggesting that the attackers were based in China." 51 That was all they could determine. blocking unauthorized access to networks. It is not so easy to balance these two imperatives. Maybe really "there is only one way to block all authorized access" Aliya Sternstein said "is to do the very thing that freedom-loving people fear the most-hit the kill switch." 53 
Strategies for Cyber Security
All the above challenges should be taken into consideration while nations develop their cyber security strategies and design their cyber security infrastructures.
These are not easy to develop because this type of security strategy is so new.
The U.S is a pioneer on this issue, so their approaches and lessons learned are important. As President Obama stressed in his speech on national cyber security May
29, 2009;
Hardening digital infrastructure to be more resistant to penetration and disruption; improving nation`s ability to defend against sophisticated and agile cyber threats; and recovering quickly from cyber incidents are the essentials to improve resilience to cyber incidents while seeking to reduce threats by working with allies on international norms of acceptable behavior in cyberspace, strengthening law enforcement capabilities against cybercrime, and deterring potential adversaries from taking advantage of our remaining vulnerabilities reducing are essentials to reduce the threat. 54 For these purposes, the U.S. government released two national strategies for operating in cyber space.
The U.S. released its International Strategy for Cyberspace (ISC) in May 2011.
The goal of the U.S. describe in this policy document as "to promote an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information and communications infrastructure that supports international trade and commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters free expression and innovation." 55 The document states that "first of all nations has inherent right to self-defense, DoD's strategy is actually defensive in nature, but reserve the right to use all necessary means -diplomatic, informational, military, and economic -, the U.S. military power will be used if necessary." 56 As laid out in specific policies in pages 18-23 in the ISC, the U.S. seeks to strengthen national infrastructure against cyber attacks, achieve agreements on international norms of acceptable behavior in cyberspace, and strengthen law enforcement capabilities against cybercrime. The goal of the U.S. cyber security strategy is a reliable, resilient, trustworthy digital infrastructure to operate effectively in cyberspace, defend national interests, and achieve national security objectives. 57 The necessary measures have to be taken to ensure to this end state are to improve resilience to cyber incidents and reduce cyber threats.  Being partner with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government cyber security strategy,
60
 Building strong relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective cyber security 61 , and  Leveraging the nation's ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation. 62 Both 2011 strategies address the inherent challenge of cyberspace. However, they did not clearly define cyber attacks. Nor do they specify how the U.S. will respond to such attacks. Even so, the U.S. has taken a leading role in international cyber security issues, as it did in the Council of Europe's 2001 Convention on Cybercrime in Budapest. 63 But the disparities among national laws and regulations are inhibiting a unified, collective approach to creating a safe, secure, and strong cyberspace. So for now, nations must cope with the domain's challenges and create and implement cyber security strategies alone.
As of March 2012, Turkey has neither officially established a national cyber security strategy nor founded an institution responsible to implement it or coordinate all cyber security efforts in public and private sectors the way the U.S. has. It is now imperative that Turkey does so, and the nation must immediately start with identifying responsible institutions and updating its laws.
Perhaps before formulating her cyber security strategy, Turkey needs an accurate and objective self assessment, to know where to start and what to do first, and identify what and where Turkey's cyber vulnerabilities are. 64 Turkey can only properly secure her digital environment by working with international partners. Turkey should strengthen its international partnership on a range of issues "such as laws concerning the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime; data preservation, protection, and privacy; and approaches for network defense and response to cyber attacks on cyber domain" 65 and act together with her allies on a host of issues, especially use of force and sovereign responsibility. The government should work with national-public and private-and international partners to promote responsible behavior and deny those who would try to harm digital infrastructure, dissuade and deter malicious actors, and be ready to defend these vital national assets.
Turkey is too small a nation to have an offensive cyber policy, and she has no reason to attack anyone. It is much more feasible for Turkey to develop a defensive policy to counter cyber attacks than to focus on offensive cyber attack and exploitation strategies. At least for now, Turkey's priority should be update and develop a defensive cyber security strategy against the real threats today.
In this defensive cyber security strategy, the Turkish government's Ministry of Transportation (MOT) should take the leading role, co working with key public and private players and military, and design an effective umbrella mechanism to achieve "a true common operating picture that integrates information from the government and the private sector and serves as the basis for informed and prioritized vulnerability mitigation efforts and incident response decisions." 66 
Institutions for Cyber Security
With the overall lead agency for cyber security identified in Turkey, the next step is to determine the support role that the Turkish military might play. Again, the U.S.
provides a useful example on how to do it. As will be evident, the military will require its own institution to protect defense-related networks and coordinate national efforts with MOT.
The United States divides principal responsibility for cyber security between the Although especially strategic government agencies increase their current level of security against cyber attacks, it is clear that these individual solutions do not provide sufficient solution for the takers. These individual efforts must be supported to invest better cyber defense solutions. Therefore Turkey needs "a national coordination body" 72 to coordinate all these individual cyber security efforts under a national office that may include different governmental institutions including a CYBERCOM also.
Turkey is set to coordinate its various individual efforts in order to build a national cyber security umbrella as part of its anti-terror warfare, including efforts to set up a national office to boost security at strategic government agencies, nationalize some of the firewalls used in others and provide national solutions in general. 73 The cyber security organizational structure of Turkey should comprise four core institutions. They can have different command and control and institutional relations in accordance with the chosen organizational structure. These four institutions should be:
The first is the Cyber Defense Foundation (CDF) should be established under the aegis of overall lead agency as a coordination office to bring and coordinate all individual efforts under a national cyber security umbrella.
Second is the Cyber National Guard Team, a government funded, white-hatted hacker organization under the aegis of the CDF. This team would include cyber security experts for protection of digital infrastructure at non-military government institutions. The
Foundation should defend the Turkish public .gov.tr domain against cyber attacks and also be responsible for security collaborations with government and private industry.
Included in these relationships are public-private partnerships with the owner/operators of strategic national assets. Turkish universities would launch postgraduate courses and education programs to produce the necessary human resources for future efforts. The National Cyber Security Coordination Foundation (USGKK), the country's first civil cyber defense agency, is a newly established governmental institution that can carry out this mission.
Third is the Operational Test Teams from within all the government agencies.
These would operate under the aegis of overall lead agency and should be established by the cyber security experts from the related governmental institutions such as the Ministries Turkish defense contractors and agencies, and law enforcement to actively probe Turkey`s cyber infrastructure, both public and private, especially .gov.tr and internal secure systems, as well as Turkey`s Internet nodes and service providers to identify vulnerabilities and mitigate risks. ICTA can carry out after relevant changes on its current structure in accordance with its new mission.
The fourth institution would be a military command modeled on the U.S. Cyber
Command. 'Turkey's CYBERCOM' would probably be a "two-or three-star Cyber
Command at the office of the General Staff." 74 The military would require its own institution to protect its own networks in the .mil.tr domain and establishing a single In COA 2, TGS takes the overall responsibility of Turkey`s cyber security alone.
In the unity of command perspective maybe it seems a good option but it is not so easy to fulfill Turkey's overall cyber security necessities by TGS alone. Even if this option can be seen as acceptable and suitable, this new endless domain needs close coordination and well organized and unified efforts against faceless enemies. In that respect, this option has feasibility problems. On the other hand, giving overall cyber security coordination to CYBERCOM in addition to its inherent cyber security responsibilities has great risk. With the challenges of risk and feasibility problem, this COA is not preferred but still could be done.
COA 3 creates the problem of civilian authority over a military institution in a new capacity. This option has some acceptability difficulties in today`s bureaucracy of Turkey, because TGS is directly under the aegis of Prime Minister and not the MOD.
While this resembles current U.S practices, it requires additional changes in military bureaucracy in Turkey to be implemented.
COA 1 seems the best COA in terms of feasibility, acceptability, suitability and risk. It meets the necessities of cyber space and spreads the responsibility between institutions. It is also suitable for today`s bureaucracy of Turkey.
Conclusion
Turkey is one of the countries who recognized the importance and danger of cyber space very early. With its developing globally-interconnected digital information and communications infrastructure, Turkey aware of cyber security risks can cause serious economic and national security challenges of today.
Turkey knows that she cannot succeed in securing her cyberspace without coordination and collaboration with her public and private sectors' institution and also with her allies.
Again, Turkey is too small a nation to have an offensive cyber policy, so it is much more feasible for Turkey to develop a defensive policy to counter cyber attacks than to focus on offensive cyber attack and exploitation strategies. At least for now, Turkey's priority should be update and develop a defensive cyber security strategy against the real threats today.
What Turkey needs today is to design an effective umbrella mechanism to bring and coordinate all individual cyber security efforts to establish her national cyber Endnotes
